Mediterranean and Middle East Northern front, East Africa, 1940

in mid-1939, general archibald wavell appointed general officer commanding-in-chief (goc-in-c) of new middle east command, on mediterranean , middle east theatres. wavell had 86,000 troops @ disposal libya, iraq, syria, iran , east africa, of 9,000 in sudan, 8,500 in kenya, 1,475 in british somaliland , 2,500 in aden. 1938, major-general william platt had been commandant of sudan defence force (al-qa id al- amm [the leader of army in arabic], kaid) responsibility defence of sudan, had 1,000 mi (1,600 km) frontier ethiopia. on 19 may 1940, british discovered through signals intelligence italian forces in aoi had been ordered secretly mobilise. before declaration of war, british detected increases in number of italian troops on sudan border , assumed if italians attacked sudan, objectives capital khartoum, 300 mi (480 km) west of eritrean frontier, atbara, junction of railways khartoum, 200 mi (320 km) border , port sudan, decent port , had heavy engineering workshops in country. ground arid , had no all-weather roads in dry weather before monsoon in june or july, ground motorable everywhere.

ultra

the italians in aoi had replaced ciphers november 1940 end of month, government code , cypher school (gc&cs) in england , cipher bureau middle east (cbme) in cairo had broken regio esercito , regia aeronautica replacement codes. sufficient low-grade ciphers had been broken reveal italian order of battle , supply situation time british offensive began on 19 january 1941. italian dependence on wireless communication, using frequencies on easy british eavesdrop, led flood of information daily report viceroy, operational plans of regia aeronautica , regia esercito. on occasion, british commanders had messages before recipients , reported later deputy director military intelligence in cairo, that

...he not believe army commander in field had [ever] been better served intelligence....