Junbi Jin and .27the Persimmon.27 Kantokuen

soviet leader josef stalin , german ambassador ribbentrop shaking hands, 23 august 1939

toward end of life, nazi dictator adolf hitler reportedly lamented: regrettable japanese did not enter war against soviet russia alongside us. had happened, stalin s armies not besieging breslau , soviets not standing in budapest. have exterminated bolshevism before winter of 1941. japanese perspective, however, germany s attitude toward cooperation against ussr during 1939–41 period 1 of ambivalence, duplicity. following defeat @ khalkhin gol, germany s sudden consummation of molotov–ribbentrop pact of non-aggression stalin met shock , anger in japan, viewed move direct violation of anti-comintern pact , betrayal of common interests. consequently, in april 1941 japan felt free conclude own neutrality pact soviets, tension west, particularly united states, began mount on japanese occupation of (vichy) french indochina previous year. american economic sanctions began pummel japan, growing threat of war in south , sense of tranquility in north tended divert japanese attention away long-planned campaign in siberia. shift particularly welcomed navy, traditionally favored policy of nanshin-ron (southward expansion) while maintaining deterrent against russia, opposed hokushin-ron (northward expansion), favored army.

hence, great shock , consternation japanese government met news of operation barbarossa, hitler s invasion of soviet union in june 1941. japanese prime minister fumimaro konoe, mortified on second betrayal of japan, briefly considered abandoning tripartite pact. on other hand, foreign minister yosuke matsuoka began advocating abandonment of neutrality pact ussr (of himself had been architect), , demanded attack in support of germany. matsuoka s views supported both kwantung army , ija general staff, eager quick decision. prior invasion, earlier in june japanese government had decided on flexible response policy establish readiness in case of need attack either northward or southward, referred junbi jin taisei ( preparatory formation setup ). under junbi jin concept, intervention in event of soviet-german war contemplated, on occasion events took favorable turn japan. although not clear-cut, philosophy defined japanese strategic thinking throughout 1941.

junbi jin encountered first serious test in form of emergency meeting of top army , navy leaders on june 24 establish new national policy bearing in mind situation in russia. during conference army vigorously argued use of force against siberia, while navy opposed it. compromise reached whereby army allowed intervene against ussr should circumstances permit, caveat preparations eventuality not interfere concurrent planning war in south. although arrangement accepted in principle, there still disagreement on how army go resolving northern question, timing of such resolution. basic conflict can summarized popular metaphor of persimmon, army general staff (ags) , kwantung army arguing offensive if fruit still green (i.e., if ussr had not suffered catastrophic collapse against germany), , opponents opting more conservative approach, assigning less immediacy manchurian front given japan s wider strategic position. point of view of ags, if japan going engage in hostilities in 1941 imperative fighting on mid-october, bearing in mind bitter climate of siberia , northern manchuria. because 60–70 days necessary complete operational preparations , further 6 8 weeks needed crush soviets in territory between manchuria , pacific, window of action quite limited. in response, army general staff proposed crash schedule planning purposes intended shave off time possible:

matsuoka, photographed in 1932





28 june: decide on mobilization
5 july: issue mobilization orders
20 july: begin troop concentration
10 august: decide on hostilities
24 august: complete readiness stance
29 august: concentrate 2 divisions north china in manchuria, bringing total 16
5 september: concentrate 4 further divisions homeland, bringing total 22; complete combat stance
10 september (at latest): commence combat operations
15 october: complete first phase of war

all in all, ags called 22 divisions 850,000 men (including auxiliary units) supported 800,000 tons of shipping made ready should war come soviets. war ministry whole, however, not in agreement army hawks . although supported notion of reinforcing north, preferred far more modest limit of 16 divisions between kwantung , korea armies in light of priorities elsewhere – force that, in opinion of kwantung army, impossible engage soviets with. message clear: japan wait until persimmon ripened , fell before acting against red army.