Aftermath Northern front, East Africa, 1940

1 aftermath

1.1 analysis
1.2 casualties
1.3 subsequent operations

aftermath
analysis

july height of rainy season rains unusually light , disrupted road travel far less usual. italians made no attempt exploit victory @ kassala, apart short advance adardeb near railway , kurmuk abandoned @ same time. italians might have believed advance difficult or overestimated size of forces opposite them. british north , west had time plan delaying campaign against advance on khartoum, atbara or port sudan. when no attack came, parties worcester , essex reinforced force outside kassala induced italians retreat town , wait. british issued intelligence summary on 18 july, described huge advantage in numbers enjoyed italians , apparent absence of intention decisively use it. attack on kassala called raid , other attacks nuisance. report concluded italians waiting on conclusion of armistice talks vichy regime in france before deciding on strategy. british concluded small british , colonial contingents in east africa had succeeded in defending frontiers of east african colonies, according strategy laid down wavell.

the british evacuation of somaliland announced on 20 august , home intelligence reports showed after period of public apathy there increasing criticism , doubts official excuses being made , scepticism reverse did not matter. after occupation of channel islands , apprehension on course of battle of britain news added public disquiet. while british press reports italian forces in aoi ...beleaguered army must live on reserves.... same italian appreciation of situation, not publicly known. member of public recorded remarking that

we should have recognised danger signals, first silence, inadequate news, hints place wasn t worth defending, successful strategic withdrawal.

some senior british officials thought defeat inevitable , pyrrhic victory italians, had used irreplaceable resources, increased dispersion of military forces in aoi , lost means follow alternatives, might have brought more success.

the british had accurately established italian order of battle , aspects of italian strategic thinking italians managed keep tactical moves secret. italian army changed cyphers on outbreak of war , british took until november break new army cypher; new regia aeronautica cypher introduced in november , broken quickly. during signals intelligence blackout, british lacked knowledge of italian order of battle, equipment , readiness; fears grew italians preparing invade sudan , kenya. when british counter-offensives began in january 1941, captured documents , inability of italians change cyphers transmissions italy created perfect conditions cryptographers war . in spite of lack of aircraft reconnaissance , no network of spies in aoi, british in 1941 had comprehensive view of italian supply situation , every italian decision. knowledge italians going retire kassala prompted british begin invasion of aoi on 19 january instead of 8 february, when british eavesdropped on italian plans , assessments of situation, before recipients had decoded signals.

while in london discussions churchill, wavell signalled cairo evacuation of british somaliland had not been cause of recriminations after more details of battle of tug argan arrived in london, churchill questioned why british had retreated , if italian superiority overwhelming if had not exploited advantage. churchill complained defence of tug argan gap had been precipitately discontinued , godwin-austen had exaggerated number of british casualties. churchill blamed local commanders failing adequately conduct fighting retreat. wavell replied high casualties not sign of leadership , churchill never forgave slight , began plan dismissal. aosta later wrote invasion plan depended on speed supply difficulties , unexpectedly poor weather , rains blocked roads slowed advance. during delay caused british defence of tug argan, aosta tried send force of 300 volunteers aircraft capture berbera coup de main scheme cancelled, because british still occupied landing ground. italians had failed exploit opportunity , given haphazard nature of evacuation , lack of defences, withdrawal might have prevented.

aosta drew various plans exploit victory in somaliland including scheme invade kenya 2 columns rendezvous @ fort hall north of nairobi, ready capture capital under text aosta wrote, extreme caution must observed. in eritrea, tessitore had proposed invade sudan after declaration of war , capture khartoum , atbara. on orders rome, aosta based strategy on events further north in libya , egypt; after italian invasion of egypt aosta considered offensive move dependent on being able link forces of italian libya, became impossible after british expelled italians egypt in operation compass (9 december 1940 – 9 february 1941). aosta liaised marshal rodolfo graziani in libya italian supplies of fuel in aoi diminished, passive defence became realistic choice. in late 1940, aosta advised war in europe end in october , waited on events.

casualties

at kassala, british lost 1 man killed, 3 wounded , 26 missing, of whom rejoined units. italian casualties 43 dead , 114 men wounded. during invasion of british somaliland, british suffered 38 killed , 222 wounded, troops of northern rhodesia regiment , camel corps machine-gunners, along equipment not embarked during evacuation; italians had 2,052 casualties , used irreplaceable fuel , ammunition. in fighting @ gallabat 6 november, british casualties 42 men killed , 125 wounded. italian losses thought around 600 men.

subsequent operations

after british reverse @ gallabat in november, wavell held review of situation in cairo 1 2 december. operation compass imminent in egypt, british forces in east africa provide patriots in ethiopia , continue pressure italians @ gallabat. kassala recaptured in january 1941, prevent italian invasion , 4th indian division transferred egypt sudan end of december. success of compass, east africa made second priority after egypt , intended have defeated italian forces in ethiopia april. italian retirement kassala on 18 january 1941, suggested british victory in egypt affecting situation in east africa , bolder british strategy justified. british offensive sudan due on 9 february brought forward 19 january , platt ordered mount vigorous pursuit , fought battle of agordat 26 31 january 1941, leading capture of agordat on 1 february , barentu next day. haile selassie deposed emperor of ethiopia crossed ethiopia on 20 january , in february, frontier battalion sdf, 2nd ethiopian battalion , nos 1 , 2 operational centres, renamed gideon force. lieutenant-colonel orde wingate ordered capture dangila , bure, had garrisons of colonial brigade each , gain control of road between bure , bahrdar giorgis, provide base selassie. arbegnoch (patriots) attack main roads gondar , addis ababa , keep many italian troops defending addis ababa possible.