Soviet Response Kantokuen

two emplacements similar these 12-inch (305 mm) guns of soviet battleship parizhskaya kommuna erected protect vladivostok harbor in 1934.

by 1942 vladivostok defense sector possessed 150 artillery pieces of 75 mm 356 mm caliber, organized 50 batteries. of these, numerous 130 mm b-13, made 20 batteries (90 guns). after german invasion, soviet forces in far east underwent radical transformation. before opening of barbarossa, red army began steady transfer of men , materiel westward europe. prior 22 june 1941 above figures had been reduced 57,000 men, 670 artillery pieces, , 1,070 tanks 5 divisions; between 22 june , 1 december further 2,209 machines sent front stem nazi tide. additionally, during same period 13 other divisions 122,000 men, 2,000 guns , mortars, 1,500 tractors, , 12,000 automobiles detached far east, along japanese estimate of 1,800 aircraft. on whole, between june 22, 1941 , may 9, 1945 aggregate total of 344,676 men, 2,286 tanks, 4,757 guns , mortars, 11,903 motor vehicles, , 77,929 horses removed far eastern , trans-baikal fronts bolster desperate fighting against wehrmacht, vast majority of whom arrived before 1943.

soviet 14 inch (356 mm) tm-1-14 railway gun; 3 installed @ vladivostok in 1933–1934.

in spite of marked reduction in materiel power, soviets undertook herculean efforts increase troop levees in expansion paralleling massive japanese build in manchuria, tracked russian , chinese observers sheer size. in accordance general mobilization ordered gko on 22 july 1941, combined strength of far eastern , trans-baikal fronts raised more 1 million 2 august. 20 december actual manpower levels totalled 1,161,202, of whom 1,129,630 regular officers or enlisted men , remainder cadets or course attendees. additionally, number of horses increased 94,607 139,150. expansion of active personnel achieved in spite of far east s limited population base through addition of reservists ural, central asian, , siberian military districts on top of on hand. furthermore, standing strength of nkvd , soviet navy augmented: between 22 june , 15 november 1941, navy manpower in far east under admiral yumashev rose 94,199 169,029, while nkvd border troops (with roster of under 34,000 before war) would, if ratio held, have likewise increased strength on 60,000. lastly there mongolians, despite lack of heavy weaponry had earlier proved against japanese @ khalkhin gol , later go on participate in soviet invasion of manchuria in august 1945. though lacked experience , organization of soviets, numbers came close 80,000.

on whole, had war broken out in late august or september 1941 ussr , mpr have been able call on 1,100,000 men, 2,000 aircraft, 3,200 tanks, 51,000 motor vehicles, 117,000 horses, , 14,000 artillery pieces mongolia sakhalin confront japanese. of these, approximately 2 thirds of personnel (including virtually entire navy) on amur-ussuri-sakhalin front while remainder defend mongolia , trans-baikal region; equipment split more evenly between 2 groupings.

the countryside between suifenhe , mutanchiang; on both sides of border immediate terrain hilly, backed flat plains.

even though situation in europe dire, soviet planners continued adhere same pre-war concept operations in fer , manchuria, exemplified stavka directive nos. 170149 , 170150 sent generals apanasenko , kovalyov on 16 march 1942. under strategy, during opening days of hostilities far eastern front (with headquarters @ khabarovsk) pacific fleet ordered conduct all-out defense of border, not allowing japanese onto territory of ussr , holding blagoveshchensk, iman (dalnerechensk) , entirety of primorye @ costs . main defensive effort mounted 1st , 25th armies (the former based @ vladivostok) on north-south axis between pacific ocean , lake khanka, while 35th army dig in @ iman. north, 15th , 2nd red banner armies, based @ birobidzhan , blagoveshchensk, strive repel japanese assaults far bank of powerful amur river. meanwhile, soviets stand firm on sakhalin, kamchatka, , pacific coast, while attempting deny sea of okhotsk ijn. aid effort, red army had years undertaken determined fortification program along borders manchuria involving construction of hundreds of hardened fighting positions backed trenches, referred tochkas (points) there 3 types of tochkas, dots (permanent fire points), sots (disappearing fire points), , lots (dummy fire points). common form of dot built soviets in far east hexagonal in shape, interior diameter of 5–6 m (16–20 ft) smaller bunkers , 10 m (33 ft) larger ones. protruded approximately 2 meters above ground level, outer wall facing front made of solid concrete 1 m (3.3 ft) or more thick. backbone of soviet defenses, dots contained 2 or 3 machine guns; equipped 1 or 2 76 mm guns, further increase firepower. soviets arranged dots belts: depending on terrain, strongpoints spaced out on 400–600 m (440–660 yd) intervals , positioned in 2 4 rows 300–1,000 m (330–1,090 yd) deep 1 another; late 1941, tochkas distributed between 12 fortified regions follows

fortified regions in amur, ussuri , trans-baikal sectors

the fortified regions sited: since there limited number of roads crossing hilly, forested frontier, soviets confident each avenue of approach covered prepared defenses have overcome via costly frontal attack, delaying enemy , forcing him pay heavily in manpower , equipment. counter tochkas, japanese forced keep considerable numbers of heavy artillery near border, ranging more modern type 45 240 mm howitzers , 300 mm howitzers antiquated 28 cm howitzer l/10 russo-japanese war. added precaution, in aftermath of battle of khalkhin gol, ija distributed special one-ton shell range of 1,000 meters type 7 30 cm howitzers meant pulverize enemy strongpoint in single hit. despite advantages conferred on them border terrain , tochka belt, red army did not intend solely hunker down , outlast japanese assault. fifth day of war, stavka ordered troops of 15th , 35th armies (minus 66th rifle division), amur red banner military flotilla , available reserves defeat japanese-manchu units opposite them, force amur , ussuri, , launch counter-offensive coordinated against both sides of sungari river in manchurian territory. final objectives of sungari front groups designated cities of fujin , baoqing, reached on 25th day of hostilities. object of attack stabilize front , relieve pressure on ussuri railway , khabarovsk areas. similarly, along front remaining soviet forces begin short counterblows in tactical depth, in keeping soviet doctrine defensive action cannot successful without coordination of position defense , counterattack. simultaneously, on opposite side of manchuria, 17th , 36th armies of trans-baikal front (with headquarters @ mount shirlova in yablonovy range) ordered hold , counterattack after period of 3 days, advancing lakes buir , hulun tenth day of war. undoubtedly consequence of ussr s desperate situation @ time, in both cases, east , west, reinforcements hinterland relatively small: 4 tank brigades, 5 artillery regiments, 6 guards mortar regiments, , 5 armored train divisions pledged assist both fronts together.

a tochka (dot), typical of found in soviet fortified regions during world war ii

with aim of supporting red army s struggle on ground, air force , navy have active role in opposing japanese invasion. in case of air force, foremost objective destruction of enemy aircraft both in air , on ground, followed tactical ground-attack missions against japanese troops assist progress of sungari offensive. other objectives included destruction of railways, bridges, , airfields in both manchuria , korea, interception of both troop transports , warships in sea of japan in coordination pacific fleet. strategic bombing limited mere 30 db-3s, sent in groups of 8 10 aircraft against targets in tokyo, yokosuka, maizuru, , ominato. concurrently, soviet naval forces strive close mouth of amur, mine tatar strait, , defend pacific coast potential landing, freeing 25th army in primorye coast defense duty. submarine patrols begin in yellow sea, sea of okhotsk, , sea of japan aim of preventing transport of troops japanese home islands asian mainland, disrupting maritime communications. soviet submariners ordered not approach japanese coast, rather operate relatively close home territory in order protect shores.

strengths , weaknesses of combatants

30 cm type 7 short (foreground) , long-barreled howitzers positioned smash soviet strongpoints

both of prospective belligerents faced array of difficulties might have impeded attainment of goals. in japanese case, although four-year war in china had provided them wealth of combat experience, understanding , application of concepts such modern military logistics , massed firepower still lagged behind red army. @ time of nomonhan incident ija regarded distances of 100 kilometers far , 200 trucks many, while zhukov s corps of on 4,000 vehicles supplied army group on 1,400 kilometer round trip nearest railheads. make lack of numbers , limited resources, japanese relied on intangible factors such fighting spirit , elan overcome foe, alone insufficient. although ija s appreciation of these 20th century military realities improved in months , years after fact , kwantung army s material strength vastly upgraded during build of 1941, fundamental reliance on spirit bring victory in battle never changed, @ expense of logical thinking , common sense. often, traditionalism , unwillingness change actively impeded improvements both technology , doctrine, point spoke matter accused of faintheartedness , insulting imperial army. toward end of war in pacific pendulum began swing in opposite direction, japanese leaders grasping @ wonder weapons such jet fighters, , so-called death ray in hope of reversing fortunes.

outline of soviet operational plan in event of war, 1942

the soviets, on other hand, operated under shadow of raging war germany. although far eastern , trans-baikal fronts had access formidable array of weaponry, demands of fighting in europe meant strength siphoned away week. moreover, state of vehicles remained mixed: prior beginning of transfers westward in 1941 660 tanks , 347 aircraft inoperable due repair needs or other causes. because soviets possessed limited offensive capability on primorye , trans-baikal directions, never hope achieve decisive victory on kwantung army, if succeeded in slowing or stopping them. furthermore, attacking teeth of prepared enemy, 1 own fortified regions , heavy concentrations of troops opposite border, hardest kind of offensive, requiring overwhelming numbers , massive means of assault succeed, neither of soviets possessed.

soviet forces in far east dispersed on vast arc mongolia vladivostok. without ability capitalize on deployment striking deep manchuria multiple axes, strength fatally diluted , prone piecemeal destruction @ hands of japanese, maneuver freely on interior lines, concentrating power @ while immobile red army fixed in place. saving grace soviets remoteness of far east european russia meant japan alone never hope deal mortal blow ussr, former reliant on germany.

organizationally, although soviet forces in far east on paper amounted 32 division-equivalents december 1941, regarded barely sufficient defensive operations. compared typical japanese division, pre-war red army units possessed less manpower, had greater access long-range, higher caliber artillery. after german invasion, however, red army reorganized each division had scarcely half manpower , fraction of firepower of either german or japanese counterpart. hence, achieve superiority on battlefield soviets have concentrate several divisions counter each of opponent s.

chi-has , ha-gos of chiba tank school during exercises (1940)



the ijn s a6m fighter superior in soviet inventory.

lastly, quality of both personnel , equipment in respective armies cannot ignored. soviets drained best, well-trained divisions fight in west, overall standard of forces in east correspondingly diminished, forcing stavka rely more heavily on fortified regions in defensive operations. meanwhile, kwantung army opposite them constituted cream of entire japanese armed forces, , receiving reinforcements day. large proportion of units elite type divisions, many of had seen extensive service in china. quality of japanese officer corps high, many figures go on have notable careers in pacific war including tomoyuki yamashita (head of kwantung defense command , later first area army), isamu yokoyama (1st division, later 4th army), mitsuru ushijima (11th division), , tadamichi kuribayashi (1st cavalry brigade, mongolia garrison army) held commands there. while both sides relied on bolt-action rifles , light automatic weapons backbone of infantry, japanese artillery found outranged heavy soviet guns @ khalkhin gol, point ija felt compelled move 15 cm howitzers closer front in order bring them bear, @ expense of cover. though japanese managed disable considerable number of soviet guns through counterbattery fire, lack of range @ extreme distances , shortage of ammunition left them @ distinct disadvantage against red army.

the formidable 152 mm ml-20 howitzer-gun capable of out-ranging japanese pieces, , fired shell weighing 43.6 kg.

tanks presented mixed picture well: although modern machine available kwantung army in 1941, type 97 chi-ha, had thicker armor (up 33 mm) compared soviet bt , t-26, low-velocity 57 mm gun common medium tanks of era outmatched long-barreled 45 mm weapons mounted on opposite numbers, while 37 mm gun used on ha-go , te-ke had effective range of less kilometer. in general, while handcrafted, beautifully polished japanese tanks more survivable diesel engines (the gasoline powerplants used russians fireprone), lesser numbers meant each loss more damaging ija each destroyed crudely finished, expendable bt or t-26 red army. during pitched armored engagement @ khalkhin gol (the yasuoka group s attack in july), japanese saw 42 out of 73 tanks disabled whereas soviet-mongol side lost on 77 tanks , 45 armored cars out of more 133 , 59 committed, respectively. balance in air have been in favor of japanese. although modern fighter in vvs arsenal available in far east, polikarpov i-16, firm opponent of nakajima ki-27, majority of planes in-theater considerably older. furthermore, soviets had no answer either mitsubishi a6m, had been fighting in china since 1940, or high-speed ki-21 bomber, fly faster , farther contemporary, sb-2. japanese pilots highly experienced, ijnas airmen averaging 700 hours of flight time late 1941, , ijaaf aviators averaging 500. many of these fliers had tasted combat against china or vvs in previous battles. in comparison, german pilots received 230 hours of flying time , soviet pilots less.

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