Decision 1941 Kantokuen

1 decision 1941

1.1 junbi jin , persimmon
1.2 kantokuen
1.3 battlefield/theater of action
1.4 weapons of mass destruction
1.5 plans occupation

decision 1941
junbi jin , persimmon

soviet leader josef stalin , german ambassador ribbentrop shaking hands, 23 august 1939

toward end of life, nazi dictator adolf hitler reportedly lamented: regrettable japanese did not enter war against soviet russia alongside us. had happened, stalin s armies not besieging breslau , soviets not standing in budapest. have exterminated bolshevism before winter of 1941. japanese perspective, however, germany s attitude toward cooperation against ussr during 1939–41 period 1 of ambivalence, duplicity. following defeat @ khalkhin gol, germany s sudden consummation of molotov–ribbentrop pact of non-aggression stalin met shock , anger in japan, viewed move direct violation of anti-comintern pact , betrayal of common interests. consequently, in april 1941 japan felt free conclude own neutrality pact soviets, tension west, particularly united states, began mount on japanese occupation of (vichy) french indochina previous year. american economic sanctions began pummel japan, growing threat of war in south , sense of tranquility in north tended divert japanese attention away long-planned campaign in siberia. shift particularly welcomed navy, traditionally favored policy of nanshin-ron (southward expansion) while maintaining deterrent against russia, opposed hokushin-ron (northward expansion), favored army.

hence, great shock , consternation japanese government met news of operation barbarossa, hitler s invasion of soviet union in june 1941. japanese prime minister fumimaro konoe, mortified on second betrayal of japan, briefly considered abandoning tripartite pact. on other hand, foreign minister yosuke matsuoka began advocating abandonment of neutrality pact ussr (of himself had been architect), , demanded attack in support of germany. matsuoka s views supported both kwantung army , ija general staff, eager quick decision. prior invasion, earlier in june japanese government had decided on flexible response policy establish readiness in case of need attack either northward or southward, referred junbi jin taisei ( preparatory formation setup ). under junbi jin concept, intervention in event of soviet-german war contemplated, on occasion events took favorable turn japan. although not clear-cut, philosophy defined japanese strategic thinking throughout 1941.

junbi jin encountered first serious test in form of emergency meeting of top army , navy leaders on june 24 establish new national policy bearing in mind situation in russia. during conference army vigorously argued use of force against siberia, while navy opposed it. compromise reached whereby army allowed intervene against ussr should circumstances permit, caveat preparations eventuality not interfere concurrent planning war in south. although arrangement accepted in principle, there still disagreement on how army go resolving northern question, timing of such resolution. basic conflict can summarized popular metaphor of persimmon, army general staff (ags) , kwantung army arguing offensive if fruit still green (i.e., if ussr had not suffered catastrophic collapse against germany), , opponents opting more conservative approach, assigning less immediacy manchurian front given japan s wider strategic position. point of view of ags, if japan going engage in hostilities in 1941 imperative fighting on mid-october, bearing in mind bitter climate of siberia , northern manchuria. because 60–70 days necessary complete operational preparations , further 6 8 weeks needed crush soviets in territory between manchuria , pacific, window of action quite limited. in response, army general staff proposed crash schedule planning purposes intended shave off time possible:

matsuoka, photographed in 1932





28 june: decide on mobilization
5 july: issue mobilization orders
20 july: begin troop concentration
10 august: decide on hostilities
24 august: complete readiness stance
29 august: concentrate 2 divisions north china in manchuria, bringing total 16
5 september: concentrate 4 further divisions homeland, bringing total 22; complete combat stance
10 september (at latest): commence combat operations
15 october: complete first phase of war

all in all, ags called 22 divisions 850,000 men (including auxiliary units) supported 800,000 tons of shipping made ready should war come soviets. war ministry whole, however, not in agreement army hawks . although supported notion of reinforcing north, preferred far more modest limit of 16 divisions between kwantung , korea armies in light of priorities elsewhere – force that, in opinion of kwantung army, impossible engage soviets with. message clear: japan wait until persimmon ripened , fell before acting against red army.

kantokuen

planned japanese penetrations on ussuri front, dates of addition in response soviet fortification

stung initial setback @ hands of war ministry, ija hardliners revenge, @ least in principle. during personal visit on july 5, 1941, major general shinichi tanaka, ags operations chief , co-leader (along matsuoka) of strike north faction in tokyo, managed persuade war minister hideki tojo support army general staff s opinions concerning rightness , viability of reinforcing manchuria. general tanaka , supporters pushed greater commitment army s june 1941 plan – total of 25 divisions in – under guise of establishing readiness stance of 16 divisions preferred war ministry. tanaka s plan involved 2 stages, build , readiness phase (no. 100 setup) followed offensive stance (nos. 101 , 102 setups), after kwantung army await order attack. entire process referred acronym of kantokuen, (kantogun tokubetsu enshu), or kwantung army special maneuvers. tojo s support kantokuen secured, hardliners completed circumvention of war ministry on july 7, when general hajime sugiyama visited imperial palace request hirohito s official sanction build up. after assurances general kwantung army not attack on own initiative after receiving reinforcements, emperor relented.

operationally speaking, kantokuen identical war plan of 1940, albeit abbreviated force structure (25 vs. 43 divisions) presumably banking on soviet inability reinforce far east in light of conflict germany. level of commitment, however, still enormous – far single greatest mobilization in history of japanese army. in order facilitate operation, tremendous quantity of both combat , logistical assets have dispatched manchuria on top of existing structure. in particular, capitalize on japanese advantage of interior lines relative soviets, railways in north , east have expanded accommodate increased burden offensive war carry. additionally, port facilities, military housing, , hospitals augmented. previous concepts drawn in aftermath of nomonhan incident, kantokuen begin massive initial blow on ussuri front against primorye, followed attack north against blagoveshchensk , kuibyshevka. under umbrella organization of first area army, japanese third , twentieth armies, supported 19th division of korea army, penetrate border south of lake khanka aim of overcoming main soviet defensive lines , threatening vladivostok. simultaneously, fifth army strike south of iman (present day dalnerechensk), completing isolation of maritime province, severing trans-siberian railway, , blocking reinforcements arriving north; these groupings comprise 20 divisions in all, equivalent in smaller units of several more. in northern manchuria, fourth army 4 divisions @ first hold amur river line before transitioning offensive against blagoveshchensk. meanwhile, 2 reinforced divisions of japanese troops outside kantokuen force structure commence operations against northern sakhalin both landward , seaward sides aim of wiping out defenders there in pincer movement. other second stage objectives included capture of khabarovsk, komsomolsk, skovorodino, sovetskaya gavan, , nikolayevsk, while amphibious operations against petropavlovsk-kamchatsky , other parts of kamchatka peninsula contemplated.

special maneuvers underway, 1941

to ensure success of this, critical phase of war, kantokuen called application of overwhelming forces: 1,200,000 men, 35,000 trucks, 500 tanks, 400,000 horses, , 300,000 laborers in 23 24 divisions offensive on eastern , northern fronts alone. have meant, however, western front facing mongolia , trans-baikal region defended 1 2 divisions plus equivalent in border guards units of few more. indeed, during initial phase of operations japanese sixth army allocated 23rd division , 8th border guards unit, veterans of fighting @ khalkhin gol 2 years before. minimize danger soviet counteroffensive in west while bulk of japanese army engaged in east, ija hoped delaying actions combined vast expanses of gobi desert , hailar plain serve strategic buffers preventing red army mounting serious challenge heart of manchuria before main body regrouped pivot west. final objective of japanese troops line running through skovorodino , western slopes of great khingan mountains, along defeat remaining soviet forces , transition defensive stance.

as in modern military operation, air power played crucial role in kantokuen plan. before outbreak of pacific war japanese intended dispatch 1,200 1,800 planes in 3 air divisions bolster existing 600 900 aircraft in manchuria, cooperate 350 navy planes launch sudden, annihilating attack on soviet far east air force both in air , on ground @ outset of hostilities. should have succeeded, japanese air units have focused efforts toward supporting ground forces on tactical level, cutting soviet lines of communication , supply (particularly in amur , trans-baikal regions) , blocking air reinforcements arriving europe.

on whole, japanese , axis forces involved in operations against ussr mongolia sakhalin have totalled approximately 1.5 million men, 40,000 trucks, 2,000 tanks, 2,100–3,100 aircraft, 450,000 horses, , vast quantity of artillery pieces.

the battlefield/theater of action

in preparing future war in far east, japanese (and soviet) strategic planning dominated 2 fundamental geopolitical realities:

1.) soviet far east , mongolian people s republic formed horseshoe around manchuria on border more 4 , half thousand kilometers in length, and
2.) soviet far east economically , militarily dependent on european russia via single trans-siberian railroad.

this second observation, perhaps more first, formed basic foundation of far eastern russia (fer) s vulnerability in war against japan. far east s population small, around 6 million citizens, relatively high percentage of whom concentrated in urban rather rural environments, suggesting emphasis on industry. consequently, lack of farmers meant there deficiency in food production both civilians , soldiers smaller pool of potential reservists. despite being allocated considerable resources under josef stalin s second , third 5 year plans (1933–1942), serious shortcomings still remained. although soviets traditionally relied on trans-siberian railway send manpower, food, , raw materials eastward overcome major deficits (sometimes forcibly resettling discharged soldiers in siberia), created problem whereby limited capacity of railroad restricted maximum size of red army force brought bear on japan, japanese estimated amount equivalent of 55 60 divisions.

thus, prolonged disruption of trans-siberian railway prove fatal both fer , soviet attempt defend it, feat rather managed japanese side tracks ran parallel frontier thousands of kilometers, coming within artillery range of manchurian border. furthermore, though encircling geography of ussr , mongolia theoretically advantageous under offensive setting granting red army opportunity strategic envelopment of manchuria (a military impossibility in 1941), on defensive strung out russian groupings vulnerable isolation , piecemeal destruction @ hands of more compact opponent. although soviets made concerted efforts address vulnerability, such beginning work on 4,000 kilometer extension of trans-siberian railway, bam line, these alone insufficient rectify basic weakness.

the limitations of trans-siberian railway , remoteness of fer proved both blessing , curse both sides. although prevented red army concentrating , supplying vast numbers of soldiers against japanese invasion , granted latter effective means of isolating territory european russia, ensured japan alone never administer decisive defeat soviet union because latter s main military , economic assets remain unharmed. ija general staff concluded offensive on 2 fronts, europe , asia, brought bear on ussr s vital industrial centers , aimed @ collapsing political resist succeed in bringing destruction.

weapons of mass destruction

since mid-1930s, japan invested large resources toward creation , development of tremendous arsenal of chemical , biological weapons, aspiring use them means of inflicting mass-casualties on chinese , soviet opponents in event of future war. during campaign in china, japanese military routinely subjected opposing population centers ruthless attacks these weapons of mass-destruction, resulting in deaths of many 2,000,000 people. oftentimes targets, such helpless city of baoshan, possessed no military value whatsoever; clogged refugees fleeing front , grossly inadequate medical infrastructure, baoshan suffered 60,000 dead after being hit cholera bombs in 1942. war against soviet union have been little different: after introduction of kantokuen plan, japan s unit 731, unit 100, , unit 516 began making extensive preparations similar operations in siberia.

on initiative of ags 1st operations division, epizootic detachments consisting of specialists unit 100 set @ each corps-level headquarters in manchuria increase kwantung army s readiness biological warfare. 3 primary media spreading disease identified: direct spraying aircraft, bacteria bombs, , saboteurs on ground. during war ussr, japanese planned make use of three, spreading plague, cholera, typhus, anthrax, , other diseases on both opposing front lines , rear areas goal of infecting populated regions, livestock, crops, , water supplies. main targets areas around blagoveshchensk, khabarovsk, voroshilov, , chita, , through 1942 extensive reconnaissance of border region conducted while detailed maps created indicating targets of opportunity biological warfare.

the kwantung army, according colonel asaoka of unit 731, regarded weapons of mass-destruction trump cards against soviets guarantee japanese victory. late 1945, supply great output of unit alone deemed sufficient supply entire japanese army; evenly distributed , under ideal conditions, claimed, japanese bioweapon stockpile capable of destroying of humanity.

plans occupation

by imperial decree on october 1, 1940, total war research institute established under direct supervision of prime minister. working closely research society study of state policy (an organization included many high-ranking japanese government ministers , industrialists), main goal create policies formation , rule on planned greater east asia co-prosperity sphere, new order in region. under provisions of administrative plan of december 1941, primorye region directly annexed empire , remaining territories adjacent manchukuo subject latter s influence. hypothetical delineation point between german , japanese spheres of influence on prostrate soviet union designated city of omsk.

the occupation managed extraordinary brutality, typical of japanese conduct in china , elsewhere during war. in general, envisioned displacement of native population make room projected influx of japanese, korean, , manchu settlers. given instructions use strictly real force, without sinking so-called principle of moderation, japanese army authorities annihilate subject soviet population survivors either converted forced labor exploit raw materials of region or exiled frozen wastelands of north. pre-existing institutions abolished , communist ideology outlawed , replaced japanese propaganda. create, if possible, façade of self-governance, number of former white movement figures (including grigory semyonov) hand-picked manage puppet government positions under japanese.

the task of setting framework of occupation regime given hata department, later 5th department of kwantung army.

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